I n t r o d u c t i o n
In real-life situations, efficiency considerations may variously dictate either disclosure or protection of privately held information. The information revelation problem i.e. elicitation of private information by means of suitable incentive schemes has always been a central theme in the literature on mechanism design, at least since the beginnings of the modern game-theoretic approach back in the early '70s. In an information revelation problem (e.g. in auctions or voting) individual agents and/or coalitions of agents must be induced to share some of their 'secret', privately held information with the service provider i.e. the agency responsible for computing and possibly enforcing the decision mechanism's outcomes.
By contrast, the reverse situation -where the service provider assigns to agen~ and//or coalitions some private in/ormation (e.g. a private key, or parts of it) which is meant to be kept as a secret by its legitimate holders-raises a few interesting issues which are best addressed within the theoretical framework of distributed cryptography. However, it transpires that the management and transmission of secret/confidential information is also of considerable significance from a game-theoretic perspective, and of growing practical importance due to the ever increasing role of electronic information processing in social and economic interactions. Here, the basic problem is of course ensuring that access rights are not abused i.e. that the entitled agents are able to protect their secret against possible insiders' or outsiders' attacks. Thus, the issue is protectz: on -as opposed to revelation-o/private in/ormation. A particularly interesting version of this problem obtains when the secret itself is to be shared among a coalition of agents.
A secret sharing scheme (SSS) is a rule for apportioning some secret information among participants in such a way that certain 'legal' sets of agents which comprise the access structure of the scheme-and only them-have joint access to the relevant data (the 'secret'). An SSS is per/ect whenever any 'illegal' coalition of agents -no matter how many shares are legally accessible to its members-cannot do any better than a coalition of outsiders, i.e. -typicallyrandomly guessing the secret among the (publicly known) set of admissible data or keys. The reciprocal of the probability of deception -that is the probability of successful random guessing-provides then a well-defined measure of the security level of the scheme.
It has been known since the late '80s that perfect SSSs do exist ]or any prescribed security level and any access structure (see e.g. Benaloh, Leichter(1990)): in particular, several examples which admit a natural implementation via modular arithmetic and combinatorial geometric structures have been designed and studied (see e.g. Simmons(1992) , Stinson(1995) , Menezes,van Oorschott,Vaustone (1997), Beutelspacher,Rosenbaum(1998)). However, a few questions remain that-to the best of my knowledge--have not been explicitly addressed in the extant cryptographic literature, namely:
• How can the class of all possible perfect SSSs at any security level be described? Is it amenable to any 'convenient' characterization within the larger class of all SSSs?
• Is it possible to implement all access structures at any fixed security level using perfect SSSs of a single type as an elementary 'building' block or different (sets of) 'building blocks' of different types are required in order to implement distinct access structures and/or to achieve distinct security levels?
It turns out that the foregoing issues can be readily addressed and solved by expressing them in a suitable coalitional game-theoretic format. This is most conveniently done relying on weak e~ectivity functions (WEFs). A WEF is a map that attaches to each coalition S the set of all outcome-subsets into which S is able to 'force' the final outcome.Thus, a WEF can also be characterized as an outcome-subsets-parameterized family of simple games i.e. sets of (locally)'winning' coalitions. A WEF is simple if such a family of simple games reduces to a unique set of (almost) globally 'winning' coalitions. It will be shown in the present note that-for any finite set K of keys and any finite set N of agents-the set of all perfect SSSs does indeed correspond precisely to the set of all simple WEFs on (N, K). Now, it can be shown that any simple WEF is representable as the intersection of a finite set of weighted simple WEFs. Since any weighted simple EF admits a 'perfect' implementation (either modular-arithmetical or combinatorial geometric), it follows that -in principlerepeated application of the latter can be used as the basic component of a universal implementation procedure for perfect SSSs of arbitrary access structure and security level.
The model
To begin with, a few basic definitions concerning key establishment protocols must be introduced. Let N be a finite set of agents or participants, K a finite set of possible secret keys to be shared. A secret sharing scheme (SSS) for (N, K) is a tuple S =(S, a, r, h) consisting of a share space S ( typically a non-empty finite set 'with structure', e. *(k,N) )), K1 = h(Ir(c~*(kl,T)) and K2 = h(lr(a*(k2, T)) entail #K1 = #K2, and h(0) = K (this last requirement reflects the typical assumption that the key set K be public knowledge).
Remark 1 It should be noticed here that the fine-grained' definition of an SSS proposed above is not standard. Indeed, SSSs are variously presented in the cryptographic literature, to an extent that makes it difficult to single out a standard definition. The most common usage consists in identifying SSSs with their sharing rules as defined above, while leaving implicit the pooling and recovering functions. I find, however, that the more detailed -if perhaps clumsier-definition offered here has some distinct advantages. Moreover, the results presented below might be appropriately reformulated according to the 'coarser' definition.
The access structure of an SSS S =(S,a, Tr, h) for (N,K) is the bipartition (L(S), L~(S)) of P(N) into legal and illegal coalitions ( or authorized and unauthorized subsets), respectively, where the set of legal coalitions is given by
Notice that-by definition of the recovering function h-the set L(S) of legal coalitions of an access structure amounts to an order filter of (P(N), D), i.e.a subset of P(N) such that for any S, T C N , if T 2 S and S • L(S) then T • L(S) (and conversely any order filter of (P(N), ~) uniquely identifies a possible access structure with N as set of participants).
An SSS S for (N, K) is said to be a (rational) threshold SSS if there exist t • IR+, and w : N ---~ IR+ ( t • Q+ and w : N --~ Q+) such that L(S) = {S ~ N: ~iesw(i) > t): the corresponding access structure is also said to be a threshold access structure. The (normalized) security level of a S = (5, a, ~r, h) is given by the (rational) number pffX _ 1, where
, and m = (#g') -1 denotes the probability of deception, i.e. the maximum probability of access to the secret on the part of an illegal coalition (under equiprobability of keychoice on the part of the key-dealing agency).
An (equMly distributed) SSS S =(S, a, ~r, h) for (N, K) is said to be perfect
Hence, a perfect SSS is equally protected against outsiders' and insiders' possible attacks.
The following construct will also be used in the sequel. 
Remark 2 Clearly enough, WEFs amount to a slight generalization of effectivity functions (EFs) (see e.g. Abdou, Keiding(1991)). Indeed, an EF on (N, X) is a WEE such that E(N) = P(X) \ {0).

)
Moreover, a WEF E on (N, X) is monotonic if for any S, T _C N, A, B C X: [A • E(S) and S _c T entail A • E(T)] and [A • E(S) and A c B entail B • E(S)], and simple if there exist an order filter W of (P(N), D), 0 ~ W ~ P(N), A* • P(X) \
any non-empty S,T C N, S ~ Wk,T • Wk : EkS(T) = Yk D {A C K: A D K~} = E~(S).
It follows that -by definition of EkS-for any S ~ Wk : {A c K: A D h(~r(c~*(k,S)))} = E~(S) = {A c K: A D K;} whence h(lr(o~*(k, S))) = K; (indeed, suppose not; then, either h(~r(c~*(k, S)) ]] K~ or w.l.o.g, h(lr(c~*(k, S))) D K~: in both cases K~ • {A C K: A D K~} \ {A C K: A D h(Tr(c~*(k,S)))}).
Hence S is perfect with security level q' = (#K~) -1 as required.
• Apart from providing a convenient game-theoretic characterization of all perfect SSS at any security level, the foregoing Proposition also entails that there exist ' 
universal" procedures which can 'uniformly' implement perfect SSS of arbitrary access structure using a unique most elementary threshold SSS as a 'building block'.
In order to substantiate that claim we shall refer to a prominent special class of implementations of perfect SSSs, namely (projective) combinatorial geometric schemes. Unfortunately enough, a presentation of geometric threshold schemes requires a quite massive amount of new definitions: they are provided below for the sake of completeness.
Remark 5 Since threshold schemes are sufficient to generate perfect SSSs of any access structure and security level, one might also use the well -known Shamir's perfect threshold SSS which relies instead on modular addition as opposed to combinatorial projective structures (see e.g. Stinson(1995)). Indeed, Shamir threshold scheme -the very first example of a perfect SSS -is arguably as intuitively appealing and elegant as typical geometric threshold perfect schemes are, and is informationally efficient or 'ideal' (i.e. its information rate-
An incidence structure is a tuple G =(P, B,~) where P, B are disjoint sets (the sets of points and blocks -or lines-, respectively) and ~ C (P U B) 2 is a reflexive and symmetric binary relation, the incidence relation on P U B. An incidence structure G = (P, B,~) is a projective space if the following properties hold:
(P1) (Line axiom): for any P, Q E P, if P ~ Q, then there exists L E B -also denoted by (PQ)-such that ~ D {(P,L), (Q,L)} ,and for any L ~ E B, 
{P, Q, R, S}= 4, if (PQ) n (RS) ~ 0 then (PR) n (QS) ~ 0
Furthermore, a projective space is said to be nondegenerate if the following condition is also satisfied (P4) (Nondegeneracy axiom): #B _> 2. Now, let IP = (P, B,~) be a projective space. A linear subset of P is a set P~C P such that (RS) C P' for any R, S E P',and the linear subspace generated by any set Q c P is
• (Q) = N {u c P: u is a linear subset of F such that Q c U}.
Moreover, the (linear) subspace of a projective space F generated by a linear subset Pt_C P is a -possibly degenerate-projective space FP= (P~, Bp,, ~p,) where Bp, = {L E B :P E P' for any P s.t. (P, L) E ~), and ~' = ~A(P~UBp,) 2
An independent set of points of a projective space P = (P, B,~) is a set of points . If a projective space P is indeed isomorphic to P(Vn), then it is said to be eoordinatized by 7~ (see again Beutelspacher, Rosenbanm (1998)). If a projective space P is coordinatized by a division ring 7~, then each point of P may be characterized by its homogeneous coordinates i.e. equivalence classes of (vector) coordinates of points in Vn (with equivalence relation '~ defined by the rule (al, .., ad+l) ~ (bl, .., bd+l) iff there exists c~ E T~,c~ ¢ 0 such that ai = c~bi, i = 1, ..,d+ 1). It can be shown that if a d-dimensional projective space P is coordinatized by a division ring T~, then a most typical instance of a set of points in general position is provided by the set C of points of a normal rational curve of P(Vn), namely-by definition-by those points whose homogeneous coordinates are either [ (1, r, . ., rd)]~ (with r E n) or [(0, 0, .., 0, 1)]~. If the relevant division ring is in particular a finite field .7: (i.e. 7~ ~-.T is finite hence commutative by the classic Wedderburn's theorem) then-for any nonnegative integer d-one may consider the finite vector space .T d so that p(~,i) is a finite projective space (coordinatized by .T whose cardinality-recall-may be given by any positive power of any prime number). Now, it should be recalled here that the sets of points of any two lines in an arbitrary projective space are bijective. Hence, in a finite projective space p(~d) all the lines comprise an equal number k + 1 of points where k is the cardinality of ~(notice that k + 1 > 3 in accordance with axiom (P2)): then, k is said to be the order of P(.T d) which is also written P(.T d, k) to make this fact explicit.
We are now ready to introduce the basic combinatorial geometric SSSs for threshold access structures that we need for our next result. 
Remark 7 Notice that dim H = t*-i hence # {P1, .., Pt} = t* entails ({P1, .., Pt}> H . It follows that for any Y C P(C) such that #Y = t* one has h(Y) = (L)f3H = {Q}. By contrast, if #Y < t* then <Y)ri(L) = O, whence h(Y) = (L).
Notation 8
We shall denote by PGTS(N) the class of basic perfect projective threshold SSSs with set of participants N as described above• It is a quite remarkable fact that a very simple 1-threshold version of such perfect geometric SSSs defined above can in principle be used as the unique 'building brick' in order to implement perfect SSSs of any access structure at any security level.
This claim is made precise by the following Proposition 9 Let YV C P(N) be any order filter of (P (N), D) , and q E Q+. Then -for any finite set K-there exist k E Z+,and (isomorphic) S1,..,Sk E k
PG']i~(N) such that S = ~i=1 Si is a perfect SSS for (N, K) at security level q and with access structure (W, P(N) \ )4)).
Proof. First, recall that order filters of (P(N), D) do essentially correspond to simple games on N. But then, one should also recall that every simple game can be regarded as the intersection of a finite number of threshold or weighted simple games. The construction goes as follows: let {T1, ..,Tk} C P(N) \ 14) be the set of D-maximal coalitions which are not in 14). Then, for any j = 1, .., k posit Wj = {S_C N : S\ Tj ¢0}.
• k
It is easily shown that 14) = Nj=i Wj (see e.g. Taylor, Zwicker(1999), Theorem 1.7.2 for more details). Now, notice that -for each j-(1Nj,P(N) \ Vgj) can be regarded as the access structure of a (1, #(N \ Tj))-threshold SSS. Hence, take a corresponding S~a04)j,q) E PG']~(N) having access structure (YVj,P(N)\ 142j) as defined above. It follows that -by definition-the resulting product SSS ~)jeJ S~ a has both security level q and access structure (N~=i Wj, P(N) \ k Nj=lW~) as required.
• It should be emphasized that the foregoing proposition provides a positive answer to the question raised in the introduction concerning indeed the availability of universal 'monogenic' implementation procedures.
Concluding remarks
The main message of the present note is that coalitional game-theoretic notions provide a remarkably natural framework for expressing a few basic ideas and results concerning key distribution protocols and related issues in distributed cryptography. In particular, Proposition 9 above shows that dimension-theoretic considerations concerning coalitional game forms suggest ways to obtain perfect SSSs of arbitrary access structure and security level starting from certain simpler perfect SSSs of one single type. Moreover, a game-theoretic outlook might also provide further interesting criteria for assessing perfect (and non perfect) SSSs. This is however best left as a topic for further research.
